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ABSTRACT 
Stream ciphers are valuable in applications where efficiency and security are both needed. 
Linear feedback shift register sequences have been the mainstay of stream ciphers in the past. 
However, Alexander Klimov and Adi Shamir recently proposed a class of invertible T-functions 
as a possible source of cryptographic building blocks for stream ciphers. In particular , they 
present the mapping xf = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) which is a permutation with a single cycle 
modulo 2n for any n. We discuss traditional stream cipher constructions and the desired 
properties of sequences produced by pseudorandom keystream generators. We then utilize these 
desired properties to analyze the aforementioned Klimov-Shamir keystream generator. Finally, 
we propose a possible construction for a keystream generator that combines a traditional stream 
cipher construction and the function proposed by Klimov and Shamir in order to produce a 
keystream that adheres to the desired properties we set forth. 
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CHAPTER 1. TRADITIONAL STREAM CIPHERS 
1.1 One-time Pad- Motivation for Stream Ciphers 
Many stream ciphers provide a level of security that is suspect or untested. However, 
the concept of a stream cipher comes from Shannon's work with the one-time pad which is 
famous for its perfect security although infeasible key management. In using stream ciphers, 
we attempt to utilize the concept of the security of the one-time pad as well as developing a 
feasible key management scheme. 
First, let us examine the one-time pad. The one-time pad is an encryption scheme in which 
the key (which can only be used once- hence the name) is a random sequence that is at least 
as long as the message. For a simple example of how a one-time pad works, suppose a teacher 
needs to report a letter grade to a student. First, the teacher and student exchange a key at 
some point in time before they desire to have this secure communication. Let their common 
key K be the randomly produced bit string K = 11100110. Assume the teacher wants to tell 
the student that he received an 'A' in the class; the message is simply the ASCII code for 
the letter 'A' which is 01000001. In order to encrypt the message, the teacher simply takes 
the XOR of the key and the plaintext message. We will use the common notation of EB as 
the XOR operation, which is equivalent to bitwise addition modulo 2. Now the teacher has 
(11100110 EB 01000001) = 10100111 and gives the ciphertext message 10100111 to the student. 
The student simply applies his key to the ciphertext (i.e., 10100111) in order to decrypt 
the message. He now has (11100110 EB 10100111) = 01000001 which is the plaintext, and if he 
is familiar with ASCII encoding, he now knows his grade. If not, he may be slightly confused. 
If we consider this example, we can see that if K is kept secret, we gain no information 
about the plaintext from the ciphertext. Assume that we know the ciphertext C; make an 
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arbitrary guess M at the plaintext (notice that C and M should have the same length). For 
any guess M we can find a K that satisfies our encryption scheme. For each bit posit ion 
Ci = 1 in the ciphertext, let the key bit ki be the complement of mi, and for each ciphertext 
bit Ci = 0, let ki = mi. The key K comprised of the ki satisfies M EB K = C. Therefore, if 
we have no information about the key, then we can do no better than guess any one of the 
possible messages. 
This amazing result leads us to the question, "Can we develop an encryption scheme with 
similar security but with reasonable key management?" The short answer is, "No, we cannot." 
However, the one-time pad has motivated the idea of using a pseudorandom number generator 
(PRNG) to produce a key for our cipher. If we can find a relatively efficient deterministic 
function that creates a sequence of bits that is indistinguishable from a bit sequence that has 
been randomly produced, t hen we have achieved the goal of creating a practical one-time pad. 
Herein lies the problem. It is usually very simple to distinguish a random sequence from a 
sequence that has been produced by a deterministic function. In the following chapters, we 
will discuss methods used to make this dist inction, and we will analyze the "randomness" of 
PRNG's. 
Recall that if we use a one-time pad, we know that any key K is possible, and therefore, we 
can have any ciphertext C for a given message M. However, we hope to use a key produced 
by a deterministic function f over a finite range (a PRNG) which is a portion of a sequence 
with a finite period. Assume that we are using a binary sequence. Within the period of this 
sequence, we may or may not have every possible n-tuple depending on the size of n. In fact , 
if n > log2 (P) where Pis the period of the sequence, then there is at least one binary n-tuple 
that does not appear in the sequence. In other words, if the period of the cycle is less than 2n, 
then there is at least one n-bit key that we cannot obtain from our PRNG. 
On the other hand, if every binary n-tuple appears in the sequence from which we choose 
our key K of at most n bits, then we can produce any output C depending on our choice of 
K . This cipher is effectively a one-time pad for messages no longer than n bits. 
The restrictions on the message and cycle length mentioned above are not practical in most 
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cases. In order to send a 1 MB binary message, we would need a function which produces a 
cycle with an outrageously large period of length 2223 . In this case, the message is 220 bytes or 
223 bits, and so, in order to have every 223-tuple, we need a period of at least 2223 bits. Also, 
the seed of such a PRNG would be at least 223 bits, which is as long as or longer than the 
message. Therefore, we gain nothing in terms of key management over a one-time pad, and 
so, we settle with creating pseudorandom sequences that have large periods that are simply 
too long to exhaustively search. This is at the heart of building a good stream cipher, and 
therefore, much of the following work will deal with identifying and evaluating the properties 
of supposed pseudorandom sequences. 
1.2 Definitions and Examples 
In order to talk efficiently and precisely about stream ciphers in general and about specific 
stream cipher properties, arguments, and outputs, we will start by developing notations and 
definitions that we will use consistently throughout this work. 
Definition 1.2.1 A binary sequence S is called random if given the first n bits s1, ... , Sn of 
the sequence, the probability of correctly guessing the next bit Sn+l is exactly ~. 
Definition 1.2.2 A dynamical system is a pair (X, T) consisting of a set X called the state 
space and a map T: X---+ X called the evolution operator (15). 
In a dynamical system, the initial state x uniquely describes the initial conditions of the 
system, and the mapping Tis a deterministic mapping to the next state xT (15). 
Definition 1.2.3 A synchronous stream cipher is one in which the keystream is generated 
independently of the plaintext message and of the ciphertext. 
The encryption process of a synchronous stream cipher can be described by the equations 
O"i+ l = f(O"i), 
ki = g(O"i), 
Ci= h(ki, mi)· 
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f is the next-state function, g is the keystream function which outputs an element of the 
keystream ki, and h is the output function which combines an element of the keystream and an 
element of the plaintext to produce an element of the ciphertext Ci (12). 
Definition 1.2.4 In certain contexts, the keystream function from Definition 1.2.3 will be 
referred to as the filtering function. 
Notice that the next-state function f fits the definition of a dynamical system. Therefore, 
this function is completely deterministic given an initial state. Our key (which should not be 
confused with the keystream) will simply be the initial state of this dynamical system. The 
keystream is the output of the keystream function and is uniquely determined by the initial 
state (i.e., the key). 
We will write M, K, and C to notate the entire message, keystream, and ciphertext respec-
tively. M, K, and C are comprised of sequential elements mi, ki, and Ci defined above. Note 
that M and C have the same length, but we can produce a keystream K that is longer than 
our message (we will always assume that K is at least as long as M and C). 
Definition 1.2.5 A keystream generator is a next-state function f that maps the current state 
<Yi to the next state <Yi+l combined with a keystream function g as in Definition 1.2.3. 
One of the most basic keystream generators that we can create is based on a linear recur-
rence relation. We will develop an example of a simple keystream generator after we define a 
few terms. 
Definition 1.2.6 A linear recurrence relation is a recurrence relation on a sequence {xi} 
which expresses Xn (for n > s where s is the length of the seed of the relation) as a first degree 
polynomial in Xk fork < n. Therefore, Xn can be expressed in the form 
(1.1) 
where the seed (x1, ... ,x8 ) of the relation is the given initial condition {16). 
Definition 1.2. 7 A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a series of registers and logic 
gates that implement a linear recurrence relation. 
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... 11100 
Figure 1.1 LFSR with three registers x1, x2, and x3 that satisfies the linear 
recurrence Xn = Xn-1 EB Xn-3· 
Figure 1.1 is a diagram of an LFSR with three registers. It satisfies the linear recurrence 
Xn = Xn-1 EB Xn-3· In this diagram, the arrows from the boxes x1 and x3 to the adder EB 
imply that the coefficients ai and a3 from Equation 1.1 are equal to one. Also note, x2 is not 
connected since a2 = 0. 
The linear recurrence relation of the LFSR in the figure is Xn = Xn-1 EB Xn-3, which is 
mathematically equivalent to the transformation represented by the matrix A in Equation 1.2 
over the field IF2. Notice that the first column of A corresponds to the coefficients a 1, a2, a3. 
Now we have anA = an+l where an is a state of the LFSR (i.e., the vector (x1 , x2, x3)) and 
an+ l is the following state. Since the upper right 2-by-2 submatrix of A is an identity matrix, 
the first and second positions in the vector an simply shift one position to the right in an+l; 
the first bit position corresponds to the result of the recurrence Xn = Xn-1 EB Xn-3 ( 4). 
1 1 0 
A= 0 0 1 (1.2) 
1 0 0 
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era= ( O 1 0 ) 
er1 = eraA = ( 0 0 1 ) 
er2 = er1A = eraA2 = ( 1 0 0) 
er3 = er2A = eraA3 = ( 1 1 0) 
er4 = er3A = eraA4 = ( 1 1 1 ) 
er5 = er4A = eraA5 = ( O 1 1 ) 
er5 = er5A = eraA6 = ( 1 0 1 ) 
er1 = er5A = eraA7 = ( O 1 0) 
Now the keystream function g simply takes the value of x1 of each state ern. So, the 
output sequence is the first bit of each state ern. In the example, we have an output of 0111010 
starting with the first bit of eraA. This is the keystream K of our stream cipher. Our keystream 
generator is simply a combination of a next-state function (which in this case happens to be 
the linear transformation A) and the keystream function g. 
Notice that eraA7 =era. So, our keystream has a period of length 7, which is unfortunately 
abysmal for cryptographic applications. In fact, A 7 = I which means that this three register 
LFSR sequence has a period of length 7 = 23 - 1 for any nonzero seed era. Furthermore, this 
is the best that we can do (i.e., the longest period we can produce) with any LFSR comprised 
of only three registers. 
Theorem 1.2.8 The period of a sequence created by a LFSR of length n is at most 2n - 1. 
Proof: An LFSR is a deterministic machine. Therefore, if we ever reach a state Si that 
is the same as some previous state, the sequence will be periodic. Since, there are only 2n 
possible states of n registers, we know that we will eventually have a periodic sequence and 
the period is at most 2n. 
Also, we can see that if we ever reach the 0 state, then all of the following states will be 0 
as well. This is because the next state is of the form anO EB an-10 EB ··· EB a10 = 0. Therefore, 
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the 0 state creates a fixed point of period 1, and its ruled out of any longer period. It follows 
that the maximum period is (2n - 1) . • 
Definition 1.2.9 A maximal length LFSR is an LFSR of length n that produces a sequence 
of period 2n - 1 given every nonzero initial state. 
Note that since every nonzero state of a maximal length LFSR is represented in the period 
of length (2n - 1) it follows that if a maximal length LFSR sequence has period of length 
(2n - 1) for one nonzero seed, then it has t he same period for every nonzero seed. 
One popular metric for measuring t he security of a keystream is linear complexity. 
Definition 1.2.10 The linear complexity of a binary sequence is the length of the smallest 
LFSR that can reproduce the binary sequence. If no such LFSR exists, the sequence has infinite 
complexity . 
Also, de Bruijn sequences are important to consider when discussing st ream ciphers. 
Definition 1.2.11 A n (m, k) de Bruijn sequence is a finite sequence so, s1, . . . , SN- l with 
N = m k terms from a set of m elem ents such that the k-tuples (sn, sn+l , . . . , Sn+k- i), n = 
0, 1, . .. , N - 1, with subscripts considered modulo N are all different (10) . 
It follows from t he definition above t hat a de Bruijn sequence of length 2n is simply a 
binary sequence in which every binary n-t uple appears exact ly once in the sequence. 
Maximal length LFSR's have been a common building block for keystream generators for 
two main reasons. First, t hey are very efficient . That is, t hey are inexpensive to implement , and 
they are fast in computation. Also, maximal length LFSR's produce sequences of large period 
wit h desirable propert ies. Namely, t he length and linear complexity of t he period can be easily 
calculated , t he sequences satisfy basic randomness postulates and t est s, and t he sequences are 
nearly de Bruijn sequences. T hese propert ies make LFSR's an attractive building block for an 
encrypt ion scheme, and we will d iscuss t hese propert ies in more det ail t he next chapter. 
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1.3 Common Constructions- Clock Controlled Generators 
A saying attributed to Massey in (14) is, "Linearity is the curse of the cryptographer." 
Therefore, we need to modify the sequences that are generated by LFSR's in order to conceal 
the linearity of the LFSR. We want to maintain a very large period as well as produce a 
sequence with a large linear complexity. In addition, we want this sequence to satisfy cert ain 
randomness tests. According to Kanso, "The use of clock-controlled shift registers in keystream 
generators appears to be a good way of achieving sequences with these properties (5)." There 
are many other constructions of keystream generators that solve the problem of linearity in 
other ways. However, we focus on the clock-controlled generators in this section. 
The first example of a clock-controlled generator, the alternating step generator (ASG), 
is comprised of two maximal length LFSR's R2 and R3 and a feedback shift register R1 that 
produces a de Bruijn sequence. R1 is used to choose which of R2 and R3 is clocked (6). So, 
if the bit of R 1 is a 1, then we advance the state of R2, otherwise we advance the state of 
R3. If R1 produces a de Bruijn sequence and has length L1 and if R2 and R3 are maximal 
length LFSR's of lengths L2 and £ 3 such that gcd(L2, £3) = 1, then the period of the sequence 
produced by the ASG has a period of length 2L1 (2£2 - 1)(2£3 - 1) (12). 
The alternating step generator is susceptible to a correlation attack, but Kanso proposes 
a generalization of the Alternating Step Generator which he calls the Alternating Step(r, s ) 
Generator. The difference is simply that the first LFSR is clocked r many t imes each round 
that it is clocked and the second LFSR is clocked s many times each round that it is clocked. 
With sufficient conditions on r and s , this construction produces a sequence with large linear 
complexity that is resistent to a correlation attack (6). 
Next, we consider the shrinking generator. This generator uses two maximal length LFSR's 
R1 and R2 with lengths £ 1 and L2 respectively. The output is generated by using the output 
bit of R1 to determine if the output of R2 is kept. Namely, if R1 outputs a 1, t hen the out put 
of R 2 is kept, otherwise, the output of R2 is discarded. Each LFSR is clocked at the same time 
(11). A shrinking generator has linear complexity of approximately L2 · 2L1 • 
The self-shrinking generator is an adaptation of the shrinking generator that uses only one 
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LFSR. It simulates the output of two LFSR's by using pairs of bits from the output sequence. 
Given a pair 10 or 11, the self-shrinking generator outputs 0 or 1 respectively. However, the 
pairs 00 and 01 are discarded by the self-shrinking generator. So, the first bit of the pair acts 
as R1 of the shrinking generator, and the second bit acts as R2. A self-shrinking generator 
made from a maximal length LFSR of length L is shown by Meier to have a period bounded 
below by 2 l ¥ J and linear complexity bounded below by 2 l ¥ J - l ( 11). 
These are a few variations of stream ciphers that have been built on the foundation of 
LFSR's. Still, at the foundation , each of these generators is built on a linear recurrence 
relation, so we want to find a new class of functions in order to build a new foundation for 
stream ciphers that is not steeped in linearity. In Chapter 3 and 4, we look at a class of 
functions proposed by Alexander Klimov and Adi Shamir to meet this challenge. 
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CHAPTER 2. PROPERTIES OF STREAM CIPHERS 
2.1 D efinitions and Notation 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Definition 2.1.1 For an ordered subset X of the domain off, if for X = (x1, x2, ... , xk) we 
have x if = x2, x2f = x 3, .. . , Xk- if = Xki xk f = x1, then we call X a cycle off. 
D efinition 2.1.2 A period of a sequen ce {x1, x2, x3, . .. } is a subsequence {xk, Xk+ l , .. . , Xk+P- d 
such that Xi = Xi+r p for any integer r and k :S i :S ( k + P - 1) . 
D efinit ion 2.1.3 The value P in D efinition 2.1. 2 is called the period of the sequen ce. 
The context of the word "period" should make it clear which defini t ion we are using. Also, 
given a period P any integer mult iple of P is also a period of the sequence. As we refer to the 
period of a sequence or cycle throughout t his work, we mean the the smallest such value P 
unless otherwise noted. 
Definition 2.1.4 A run is a series of 1 's or a series of O's in a sequences that is preceded and 
succeeded by O's or 1 's respectively {1 2) . 
D efinition 2.1.5 A gap is a run of O's, and a block is a run of 1 's {12). 
2.1.2 Notation 
We will also use the notation x % n to denote the remainder when x is divided by n . The 
common notation x = y (mod n), therefore, is equivalent to x 3 n = y 3 n. 
A variable (e.g., x) followed by a function (e.g., J) , is taken to be t he result when the 
function is evaluated at t he variable. Therefore, x f is equivalent to t he more common notation 
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f(x). We will use the two interchangeably. Also, a function raised to a power k (e.g., J k) is 
taken to be k compositions of the function. For example, x f 2 is equivalent to the common 
notation of J(f(x)) (note: J0 is the identity mapping). Hopefully, using this notation will 
considerably reduce the number of unwanted parentheses. 
We define JIB := {O, 1} and IIBn to be the set of all n-tuples of the set {O, 1 }. At times we will 
use IIBn interchangeably with Z2n . This depends on whether we are thinking of the bit string 
as the binary representation of an integer in the set {O, 1, ... , 2n-l} or as simply an ordered 
sequence of n bits. 
We notate an entire output sequence of a dynamical system with a capital letter (e.g., X 
or S). This may be an infinite sequence or a single period of a cyclic sequence. We denote 
elements of the ordered sequence X by Xi, and Xi is followed by Xi+ 1 in the sequence X. In the 
instance where the output Xi is in Z2n, we can further break down the binary representation of 
Xi· To isolate particular bits of the binary representation of Xi, we count the bits of a number 
y E IIBn starting with 1 at the least significant bit . We write the i-th bit of y E IIBn as [y]i. So, the 
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n-th and most significant bit of y E IIBn is written [Y]n· Also, if y E IIBn, then y = L (2k- l. [Y]k) 
k=l 
in Z2n . For example, with the binary string 10010, the 2nd and 5th bits are 1 and the 5-tuple 
is equivalent to 18 E Z25. An n-tuple of IIBn is simply the binary representation of an integer 
in Z2n padded with O's when necessary. 
For any x E IIBn with n 2: 1, we will represent the bitwise complement of x with the notation 
x. 
2.2 Basic Properties of Synchronous Stream Ciphers 
A synchronous stream cipher , as the name suggests, must be synchronized. This means 
that the sender and the receiver must have the same key and must be utilizing the same state 
within the keystream generator in order for the encryption and decryption to be successful. If 
a bit is inserted in or deleted from the keystream during encryption or decryption, then the 
decryption and encryption will not be synchronized after that point in the keystream (12). 
However, synchronous stream ciphers do not have any error propagation since they are 
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not dependent on the plaintext or on the ciphertext. Therefore, if a bit is changed, but not 
deleted or inserted, the other bits of the message will not be affected during decryption. So, in 
general, synchronous stream ciphers allow a receiver to identify when an attacker has deleted 
or inserted ciphertext. Also, it is possible to identify a replay attack, since the stream must 
be synchronized by the sender and the receiver (12). 
Similar to any cryptanalytic endeavor, as we analyze a keystream generator, we want to 
know how difficult it is for an adversary to find the key. The key for a keystream generator is 
the initial state of the next-state function. Assuming we know the next-state function as well 
as the keystream function we can find the entire keystream with the initial state. This initial 
state is sometimes referred to as a seed, and it serves as the secret key of a stream cipher. 
A typical attack on a stream cipher is a known-plaintext attack. We have a message M, a 
keystream K, and ciphertext C that are all binary sequences of similar length. We assume we 
know a certain number of bits of plaintext paired with the corresponding bits of the ciphertext; 
with these pairs ([M]i, [C]i), we can find [K]i. For a binary additive stream cipher, we simply 
have [M]i EB [C]i = [K]i. So, with a known plaintext attack, we have a segment of the keystream, 
and we want to identify the initial state of the function. 
Next, we will explore desirable properties of keystreams. We will present what we feel to be 
minimum requirements for a keystream to be considered acceptable; with these properties, it 
is thought that a keystream is more likely to be secure than without these properties. This is 
based on the advantage we obtain of correctly guessing the keystream bit [K]i+l when we are 
given [K]i, ... , [K]i. From Definition 1.2.1, we can see that in a random sequence we gain no 
advantage. We hope that in a pseudorandom sequence, any advantage of correctly guessing the 
next keystream bit will be either difficult to utilize or negligible in magnitude. The minimum 
requirements that we introduce in the next section do not guarantee that this will be the case, 
but they do act as a filter for sequences that would be poor keystreams. 
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2.3 Pseudorandomness 
A truly random sequence cannot be reproduced , and therefore, cannot be created by a 
deterministic function. However, we will introduce a few widely accepted postulates that are 
necessary requirements for a sequence to be considered pseudorandom. 
Solomon W. Golomb has proposed three postulates to which a periodic pseudorandom 
binary sequence should hold. They are as follows: 
Postulate 1 In a period of a sequence S, the number of 1 's differs from the number of O's by 
at most 1 (4)(12). 
Postulate 2 In a period of a sequence S , at least half of the runs have length 1, at least one-
fourth have length 2, at least one-eighth have length 3, etc. as long as the number of runs so 
indicated exceeds 1. Moreover, for each of these lengths, there are (almost) equally many gaps 
and blocks (4)(12). 
Postulate 3 The autocorrelation function C(t) of a sequence S is two-valued. That is for 
period P and for some integer K, 
1 P { 1, if t = 0 (mod P), 
C(t) = P · :L(2[S]i - 1) · (2[S]i+t - 1) = 
i= l K if 1 < t < P - 1 (mod P) P' - -
(2.1) 
(4)(12) 
The impetus for these postulates can be intuitively derived from our definition of a random 
sequence. From our definition of random, we can see that we have an equal probability of having 
a 1 or a 0 in a particular position in a random binary sequence. Therefore, a sequence of random 
bits should have approximately the same number of l's and O's, and so, a pseudorandom binary 
sequence should satisfy Postulate 1. Notice that in a sequence of odd length the number of l 's 
and O's will differ by at least one; this is the reason for the allowance of a difference of one. 
Next, let [X]i be the first bit in a run of X. Without loss of generality, we can let this run 
be a block (a run of l's). By definition, the previous bit in the sequence [X]i- 1 = 0. To say 
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that the block has length m is to say that the next ( m - 1) many bits are all equal to 1 and 
that these 1 's are followed by a 0. If X is random, then the probability of this occurrence is 
2-(m-l) · 2- 1 = 2-m. Therefore, a random sequence should satisfy Postulate 2. 
A random binary sequence should satisfy Postulate 3 simply due to the independence of 
each bit in the sequence. If we shift a binary sequence S of finite period P by t positions, then 
we have the period {[S]t, [S]t+1, ... , [S]p, [S]i, [S]t-d· Now, if we compare the corresponding 
bit in the original sequence with those of the shifted sequence (i.e., compare [S]i and [S]i+t 
via the function C), we should see no correlation between the two. That is, the bits should be 
equal with probability ~' and we should find that the number of bit pairs that are the same 
and the number of bit pairs that are different are nearly identical. 
The postulate states that the autocorrelation function C(t) should be two valued; namely, 
C(t) = 1, if t = P (mod P), and C(t) = 1J,, if 1 :S t :S P - 1 (mod P) where P is the 
period. Ideally, we can say that K = 0 for even P and IKI = 1 for odd P. Maximal length 
LFSR sequences satisfy Postulate 3; these sequences have odd length equal to 2k - 1 where 
k is the length of the seed of the shift register (4). In Figure 2.1, we show the graph of the 
autocorrelation value C(t) for 1 :St :S P for a sequence that was created by an LFSR with 8 
registers. Notice the period is 255 = 28 - 1, and note that the value of C(t) for all t -1- 255 
is - 2~5 . So, if we can find values oft -1- 0 (mod P) such that the autocorrelation function 
C(t) -1- fj, then we can say that there is a correlation between bits [S]i and [S]i+t for any 
integer i, and therefore, the sequence S does not satisfy Postulate 3. 
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Figure 2.1 C(t) for maximal length LFSR with 8 registers. 
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CHAPTER 3. T-FUNCTION KEYSTREAM GENERATORS 
3.1 Definitions and Notations 
3.1.1 D efinitions 
Definition 3.1.1 Let x and y be n -bit input variables. A function ¢ (x) : JBkxn ---> JBn is called 
a primit ive funct ion if k = 1 and ¢ (x) is either n egation or complem entation, or if k = 2 and 
¢ (x, y) is one of the operations of XOR, OR, AND, addition modulo 2n, subtraction modulo 
2n , or multiplication modulo 2n (7). 
Definition 3.1.2 A function f : JBn ---> JBn is called a T -funct ion if the k-th bit of the output 
[f(x )]k depends only on the first k bits of the input [x]ki . . . , [x]i (7). 
Definition 3.1.3 A T-junction f : JBn ---> JBn is a maximal length T -function if it defines a 
permutation with a single cycle modulo 2n . 
Definition 3.1.4 The dimension of a finite binary sequence S , denoted dim ( S ), is the num ber 
of bits of S . That is, S is an elem ent of the set JBdim(S) . If S is an infinite sequence of period 
P , we define dim(S) = P. 
Definition 3 .1.5 A bit slice of a sequence S E JBkxn is the a sequence of the k many i -th bits 
of the elem ents Sj E lBn of the sequence S. The i -th bit slice of S is [s1]i, . . . [sk]i. 
3.1.2 Notation 
We have been using capital letters to represent complete sequences or a complete period of 
a sequence. We will use lower case letters to represent a subsequence of a complete sequence 
or period. For example, define u := { [S]i , .. . , [S] E } and v := {[S] E+1' ... ,[S]p} where P 
2 2 
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is the period of S. Given two subsequences u and v, we will write { u I v} to represent the 
concatenation of u and v. Therefore, in our example { u I v} = S (notice that { u I v} is a 
single period of S, and so, we flippantly represent S by a single period since we assume that 
the period can define the entire sequence even if the sequence has infinite length). 
dim (u) 
Define 'lj;(u, v) := L (2[u]i - 1) · (2[v]i - 1) for dim(u) = dim(v). Notice that 'lj;(u, v) = 
i=l 
'lj;(v,u) = 'lj;(u,v) = - 'lj;(u ,v). Also, for dim(u1) = dim(v1), dim(u2) = dim(v2) , and for 
u = {u1 I u2} and v = {v1 I v2} we have 'lj;(u,v) = 'l/;(u1,v1) + 'l/;(u2,v2). Now, for this 
definition of 'I/;, the value of C(t) from Postulate 3 for a ?-periodic sequence S is j, · 'lj;(S, St) 
where St is the sequence S with a phase shift oft bits. 
3.2 Advantages of T-functions 
One of the guidelines for cryptographic applications set forth by Christof Paar in (13) is to 
consider the target platform for the implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. He states, 
The efficiency of an implementation algorithm often depends heavily on the details 
of the target platform, e.g., on the instruction set or the pipeline structure of a 
processor. Hence, theoretical complexity measures, such as the bit complexity, 
can be misleading in practice. In the future, one should also focus on developing 
algorithms for software and hardware which take the nature of the target platform 
into account. 
Paar cites Alexander Klimov and Adi Shamir's work with T-functions as an example of devel-
oping algorithms with the target platform in mind. 
In (7), Klimov and Shamir focus on the efficiency of encryption in hardware. They intro-
duce T-functions composed of primitive functions as a source of possible keystream generators. 
Primitive functions are generally implemented as a single machine instruction on a processor 
and are therefore, quite efficient in existing hardware. In order to use as few machine in-
structions as possible, Klimov and Shamir examine all T-functions comprised of two or three 
machine instructions. They determine that each of the functions comprised of two instructions 
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define uninteresting cycles. However, Klimov and Shamir propose a T-function to be used as 
a building block for stream ciphers that is comprised of only three machine instructions (7); 
this function will be be further analyzed in Chapter 4. 
One of the most attractive properties of T-function sequences is that we can check the 
invertibility of a T-function. In (7), a general method for checking the invertibility of a T-
function is outlined. Here, we will simply outline how we can verify whether or not a T-function 
is invertible on a case by case basis. Consider the T-function x f = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n). 
Consider two output values xif and x2f. If f is invertible, then xif = x2f ===? x1 = x2. 
Since f is a T-function we can first check the equality of the least significant bit of xif and 
x2f which are independent of the upper bits. If [xif]i = [x2f]i, then it is easy to verify that 
[x1]i = [x2]i. Now, since we know that the least significant bit of x1 and x2 are the same, 
we can verify that the second least significant bit (which is dependent only on the first two 
bits) is the same in both x1 and x2 under the condition that xif = x2f. In this manner , we 
can guarantee invertibility of any T-function over the set IBln. This is important as we work to 
guarantee that the cycles of our keystream generator are always large. 
We define fk by xfk = x f (mod 2k) where k ::; n. When we write f n, this is simply the 
function f , but this should provide clarity that f is defined over IBln. Now, if f is invertible, it 
implies that fk is invertible. If xfk = Yfk, then xf = yf (mod 2k) ===? x = y (mod 2k). This 
follows from the fact t hat f is a T-function (think about it). 
We can find invertible T-functions that produce an output cycle with a period of length 2n 
when the function is evaluated modulo 2n. These are maximal length T-functions as defined 
in Definition 3.1.3. This is notable since maximal length T-functions do not have 0 as a fixed 
point as do maximal length LFSR sequences. Also, since the sequence has a period P = 2n 
for arbitrary n, we have a lower bound of (2n- l + 1) on the linear complexity of the sequence. 
As we develop the method for creating a stream cipher from a maximal length T-function, 
we will see that the filtering function 9m is very important. We first start with a next-state 
function f with an output x f E Z2n, and we can interpret this as a sequence of bits in En . 
We will define our filtering function as 9m : En ___, IBlm; Xi f---* [xi]n, ... , [xi]n- m+l for some m 
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such that 1 :S m < n; our choice of m is vital. Klimov and Shamir do not definitively state 
the ideal value of m. They simply state that m « n. In the next chapter, we will discuss an 
attack that makes it clear that for one T-function in particular ~ is not an acceptable value 
of m. We will mainly focus on m = 1, but, at times, we will take excursions to explore the 
consequences of using larger values of m. 
3.3 Constructions for Keystreams 
There are two common methods for defining the next state of a synchronous stream cipher. 
Counter Mode: Let f : Z2n ----t Z2n; CJ t----t CJ + 1. Let g : Z2n ----t En be a maximal 
length T-function. We create a cycle as follows: CJj,CJjg,CJj2g, ... ,CJj2n _ 1g or equivalently 
crg, (CJ+ l)g, (CJ+ 2)g, ... , (CJ+ 2n - l)g. 
Feedback Mode: Let f : En ----t En; x t----t xf be a maximal length T-function. We create 
a cycle of f with initial state x E En, by applying f to the previous state. The cycle is 
2 2n 
represented by xf, xf , ... , xf . 
Counter mode enables us to move with ease to different states of the cycle since we simply 
apply the function to an integer modulo 2n. However, feedback mode creates a more secure 
cipher in some cases since it often creates less predictable properties in the output cycle. That 
is, feedback mode is more likely to cause a higher level of confusion in the bits of the keystream 
for certain types of functions. 
We will focus on the cycle created in feedback mode in the following chapter as we discuss 
the generator proposed by Klimov and Shamir, because the particular function that is proposed 
seems to behave more favorably in feedback mode. It may be the case that feedback mode is 
a more natural construction for T-functions in general, and this is the construction that we 
be assumed unless otherwise stated. However, we want to make our discussion as general as 
possible. Therefore, we will try to extend the results of this chapter to counter mode whenever 
possible. 
It should be obvious that we cannot keep the entire state of an output of the next-state 
function; this is simply the key of the cipher since an attacker who knows the current state 
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along with the next-state function could then produce the keystream. Therefore, we need to 
apply a keystream or filtering function to the states of the cycle of f. 
For our work with T-functions, we will simply keep t he m most significant bits of the 
output of the T-function f modulo 2n to form our output sequence. Let Xi be the the i-th 
output off and [xi]j be the j-th bit of Xi· Then our filtering function gm is defined as follows 
gm : Xi 1----+ [xi]n, ... , [xi]n-m+l· Note that gm is applied to each state of a keystream generator 
to produce a keystream. Then we have, 
S = {[xi]n, · · ·, [xi]n- m+l I [xi+l]n, · · · , [xi+1]n-m+l I · · · I [xi+n]n , · · ·, [xi+nln-m+l, · · ·} 
(3.1) 
S is the binary keystream and each Xi is in lIBn . 
Notice that our security drastically reduces as we increase our value of m. Remember that 
we assume the attacker knows the function and the value of n and m. So, if an adversary 
knows m bits of each state, he simply has (n - m) bits of the internal state (i.e., the key) to 
guess. Therefore, the attacker would have to search at most 2n-m many states instead of 2n . 
This is why it is necessary for m « n. 
3.4 Properties of T-function Cycles and Streams 
We now want to make some observations about the properties of t he sequences created 
by maximal length T -functions. We have found that the cycles of such functions have a 
tremendous amount of structure especially as we examine the bit slices of the cycle. 
Theorem 3.4.1 is found without a proof as Lemma 3 in (7). 
Theorem 3.4.1 Let f: lIBn-> lIBn be an invertible T -junction and define fk by x fk = x f (mod 
2k) where k < n. Then for each cycle of length l of fn - 1, there are either two cycles of length 
l or one cycle of length 2l off n (1). 
Proof: Let m = n - 1, and assume we have a cycle of length l of f m· That is, xifm = 
x2, x2fm = X3, . . . , xzfm = X1 for some ordered subset X = {x1, x2, . .. , x1 } of t he domain of 
f m· 
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Now, we will extend the set X := { x1, x2, ... , xt} with Xi E IB\m to the sets X ·-
{A A A } d XA 1 { A' A' A'} "th A A/ TlJ)n h A A/ ( d 2m) b X1,X2, ... ,x1 an := X1, X21···,X1 WI Xi,Xi E fill were Xi= xi mo ' ut 
Xi =/:- x~ for i E {1, 2, ... , l} . That is, Xi and x~ differ only in their most significant bits. Notice 
that {x1, X2, ... , xt} = x = {x~ , x;, ... , xD (mod 2m). We see this from the following: 
Let :1:1 be x1 with a additional 0 in the n-th bit position. Now, we can say that the most 
significant bit of x~ is 1 since xi =: x~ (mod 2m) , but xi =/:- x~ . Now choose { x2, ... , x1 } such 
that x ifn = x2, x2 fn = x3, ... , (x1-1)f n = x1. This also defines the remainder of the values 
{ x;, ... , x ;} , since x~ and xi differ only in t he most significant bit. 
Since f n is a T-function, the first n - 1 bits of xf n are dependent only on t he first n - 1 
bits of x we can say that if x = y (mod 2n-l ), then x fn = Yfn (mod 2n-l ). 
Now, since x is a cycle xdm = X1, which means X1 = xdn = x~ (mod 2m). Since fn is 
invertible it follows that either xdn = :1:1 or xdn = x~ . If the former case holds, we have two 
cycles x and X' of fn, since xdn = X1 and x;Jn = x~ . In the case where fn(x1 ) = x~ we have 
one cycle of length 2l. It can be written, :1:1, i2, ... , i1, x~, x;, ... , x;, x1. • 
If we only consider maximal length T-functions, then t his result is t rivial for the counter 
mode construction. In the following pages we will focus on maximal length T -functions. 
Theorem 3.4.2 Let fn : IB\n --+ IB\n be a maximal length T-junction. Then the i -th bit slice of 
the output cycle is a binary sequence that has least period 2i . 
Proof: Assume we have a maximal length T-function f, and assume fi - 1 has a cycle of 
length l = 2i-l . By Theorem 3.4.1, we know that f i has eit her 2 cycles of length l or one 
cycle of lengt h 2l . Since f is a maximal length T-function, it has one cycle of length 2i . 
Taken modulo 2i, we have t he cycle, i 1 , i2, . .. , x1, x~ , x;, ... , x;, x1 as defined in the proof 
of Theorem 3.4.1. Notice that the least period of the i-th bit slice divides 2i since the cycle 
has length 2i . 
If we assume that the period of the bit slice also divides 2i-l, then we have [xd]i = [x1]i. 
Since xlf = x1 (mod 2i- 1), it follows that xlf = x1 (mod 2i). This is t hen a cycle of length 
l of fi which contradicts our assumption. Therefore, the period of the i-th bit slice divides 2i 
but not 2i- l, and so the period is 2i. • 
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Since we are dealing with the maximal length T-functions in Theorem 3.4.2 and we use 
only the result of Theorem 3.4.1, Theorem 3.4.2 extends to cycles created in counter mode as 
well. We can see an example of Theorem 3.4.2 in Table 3.1 for a T-function cycle created in 
counter mode and in Table 3.2 for a T-function cycle created in feedback mode. The boldface 
bits represent one period of the bit slice. 
This result allows us to derive a result about the linear complexity of binary sequences that 
we obtain from the bit slices of T-functions. Since we know that the i-th bit slice has a period 
of length 2i, we can cite a result from Chan, Games, and Key that gives an upper and lower 
bound for the linear complexity of such a binary sequence. In (2) we see that if S is a binary 
sequence with period 2n , then the linear complexity of S, £ (8), satisfies 
(3.2) 
Therefore, the linear complexity of the bit slices of maximal length T-functions will be very 
large. 
Theorem 3.4.3 Given a maximal length T-junction f n with a cycle S , for 1 :S: i :S: n , we can 
say that the value of the i-th bit of the j -th output Sj E lIBn in the cycle S is the complem ent of 
the i-th bit of the (j + 2i-l )-th output sj+2i-1 of the cycle. Whereas, the i - 1 least significant 
bits are unchanged by a shift of 2i- l steps in the output cycle. That is, [sj] i -1- [sj+2i- 1]i and 
([sj ]i- 1, [sj] i- 2, ... , [sj]i) = ([sj+2i- 1]i- li [sj+2i- 1]i- 2, . . . , [sj+2i-1]i) . 
Proof: We know that the k-th bit slices are 2k periodic by Theorem 3.4.2. So, for k < i , 
the k-th bit remains the same after a shift of 2i- l steps in the output cycle. That is, [sj]k = 
[sj+2i- 1]k for k < i. However, we know that Sj -1- sj+2i- 1 (mod 2i) since fi defines a single 
cycle modulo 2i. Therefore, [sj]i -1- [sj+2i- 1]i. • 
This result also carries over to cycles created in feedback mode. 
3.5 Vulnerabilities of T-functions 
We have st ated a few propert ies of the cycles and bits slices of cycles of maximal length 
T-functions that reveal the structure of a keystream that is generated by such a function. Now 
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Table 3.1 Example of Theorem 3.4.2 for x f = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 25 ) in 
counter mode. 
x x f [x f]5 [xf ]4 [xfh [x f b [xf]i 
0 5 0 0 1 0 1 
1 6 0 0 1 1 0 
2 7 0 0 1 1 1 
3 16 1 0 0 0 0 
4 25 1 1 0 0 1 
5 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 11 0 1 0 1 1 
7 28 1 1 1 0 0 
8 13 0 1 1 0 1 
9 30 1 1 1 1 0 
10 15 0 1 1 1 1 
11 8 0 1 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 1 
13 26 1 1 0 1 0 
14 19 1 0 0 1 1 
15 20 1 0 1 0 0 
16 21 1 0 1 0 1 
17 22 1 0 1 1 0 
18 23 1 0 1 1 1 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 9 0 1 0 0 1 
21 18 1 0 0 1 0 
22 27 1 1 0 1 1 
23 12 0 1 1 0 0 
24 29 1 1 1 0 1 
25 14 0 1 1 1 0 
26 31 1 1 1 1 1 
27 24 1 1 0 0 0 
28 17 1 0 0 0 1 
29 10 0 1 0 1 0 
30 3 0 0 0 1 1 
31 4 0 0 1 0 0 
24 
Table 3.2 Example of Theorem 3.4.2 for xf = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 25 ) in 
feedback mode. 
x xf [xf]5 [xf ]4 [x fh [xf ]2 [xf]1 
0 5 0 0 1 0 1 
5 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 7 0 0 1 1 1 
7 28 1 1 1 0 0 
28 17 1 0 0 0 1 
17 22 1 0 1 1 0 
22 27 1 1 0 1 1 
27 24 1 1 0 0 0 
24 29 1 1 1 0 1 
29 10 0 1 0 1 0 
10 15 0 1 1 1 1 
15 20 1 0 1 0 0 
20 9 0 1 0 0 1 
9 30 1 1 1 1 0 
30 3 0 0 0 1 1 
3 16 1 0 0 0 0 
16 21 1 0 1 0 1 
21 18 1 0 0 1 0 
18 23 1 0 1 1 1 
23 12 0 1 1 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 6 0 0 1 1 0 
6 11 0 1 0 1 1 
11 8 0 1 0 0 0 
8 13 0 1 1 0 1 
13 26 1 1 0 1 0 
26 31 1 1 1 1 1 
31 4 0 0 1 0 0 
4 25 1 1 0 0 1 
25 14 0 1 1 1 0 
14 19 1 0 0 1 1 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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we will discuss how these properties create possible vulnerabilities in those keystreams. 
The last result of the previous section actually gives us more specific information about 
the linear complexity of a bit slice of the cycle of a maximal length T-function. In (2), Chan, 
Games, and Key show that the following statements are equivalent 
£(S) = 2n- 1 +1 
S = {x Ix} 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Therefore, because of the result in Theorem 3.4.3 we know that any bit slice of a maximal 
length T-function has the least possible linear complexity of a binary sequence of period 2n for 
some n. Again, this is not a major problem since we know that the linear complexity is still 
quite large. However, in (2), we also see that if S is a de Bruijn sequence (which has length 
2n), then the complexity £(S) satisfies the inequality below if n 2: 3. 
£(S) 2: 2n-l + n (3.5) 
Therefore, we know that for n 2: 3, then-th bit slice of a maximal length T-function does not 
produce a de Bruijn sequence. 
Consider the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator form = 2. The period is of the keystream 
is 2n+l , and notice that the second half of this period is not the complement of the first. This 
is because we combine the n-th and (n - 1)-th bit slices, and the (n - 1)-th bit slice has a 
period half the length of the period of then-th bit slice. This means that our linear complexity 
is greater t han 2n + 1. Therefore, we can no longer use the above argument to say that this 
keystream is not a de Bruijn sequence. However, further exploration of this keystream may 
show that this is not a de Bruijn sequence either. 
Recall Postulate 3; the autocorrelation function of a pseudorandom sequence should be 
two-valued. Namely, C(t) = 1 for a phase shift oft = 0, and C(t) = x where x = 0 or x ~ 0 
for all other phase shifts t. We will show that any keystream S generated by a maximal length 
T-function and any value of m for our filtering function 9m : Xi f---t [xi]n, . .. , [xi]n- m+1, S does 
not satisfy Postulate 3. 
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Theorem 3.5.1 If a sequence S is equivalent to the n-th bit slice of a maximal length T-
function modulo 2n , then for P = 2n and t 1 + t2 = ~ we have C(t1) = -C(t2) where C is the 
autocorrelation function from Postulate 3. 
Proof: The period of the given sequence S is 2n = P . Assume without loss of generality 
that t1 ~ t2. We divide the first half of the period of the sequence S into three parts u1, v and 
u2 where i1 = dim(u1) = dim(u2), and i2 = dim(u1) + dim(v) . Therefore, dim(u1) + dim(v) + 
dim(u2) = ~-
By Theorem 3.4.3, we can write a complete period of Sas {u1 I v I u2 I u1 I v I u2} where 
u1 is the bitwise complement of u1 . 
Now we can write the original sequence and the sequences shifted by t1 and t2 as follows: 
s = { u 1 I v I u2 I u 1 I v I u2} 
St1 = { u2 I u1 I v I u2 I u1 I v} 
St2 = {v I u2 I u1 I v I u2 I u1} 
Now, if we evaluate C(t1), we have the following: 
l P - 1 
C(t1) = p L (2[S]i - 1). (2[S]i+t1 - 1) 
i=O 
1 
= P · 'lf;(S,St1 ) 
1 
= p . 'If; ( { u 1 I v I u2 I u 1 I v I u2} ' { u2 I u 1 I v I u2 I u 1 I v}) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
1 
= p · ['l/J({ui}, {u2}) + 'l/J( {v I u2}, {u1 Iv})+ 'l/J ({ui}, {u2}) + 'l/J ({v I u2}, {u1 Iv})] 
1 
= - p · ['If; ( { u i} , { u2}) + 'If; ( { v I u2} , { u i I v}) + 'If; ( { u i}, { u2}) + 'If; ( { v I u2}, { u i I v}) J 
1 
= - p · ['lfJ({v I u2},{u1 I v}) + 'l/J ({ui},{u2}) + 'l/J ({v I u2},{u1 I v}) +'lf; ({ui} , {u2})] 
1 
= - p · ['If; ( { u 1 I v}, { v I u2}) + 'If; ( { u2}, { u i}) + 'If; ( { u 1 I v}, { v I u2}) + 'If; ( { u2}, { u i}) ] 
1 
= - p · 'If; ( { u 1 I v I u2 I u 1 I v I u2}, { v I u2 I u i I v I u2 I u i}) 
1 
= - P · 'lf;(S,St2 ) 
= - C(t2) 
(3.9) 
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Therefore, if i1 + i2 = f, then C(t1) = -C(t2) as desired. • 
From the above result , we can see that C( ~) = 0 and C( f) = -C(O) = -1. Also, since 
we know that the second half of this sequence is simply the complement of the first half of the 
sequence according to Theorem 3.4.3, we can see that 
l P-1 
C(t) = p L (2si - 1) · (2si+t - 1) 
i=O 
l P-1 
= pL(-1)=-1 
i=O 
when t = f. So, when C(t) = -1, every bit of the original sequence Sis complemented in the 
shifted sequence St. 
We can see the more general result in Figure 3.1 for a specific maximal length T-function. 
Notice that the points in the graph are reflected about line at ~ with an inversion. This shows 
the result of Theorem 3.5.1. Also, note that the points are reflected about the line at f. This 
is simply due to the fact that a shift of forward oft many bits is the same as a shift backward 
of P - t many bits, which is the case for any periodic sequence. 
If we break a maximal length T-function sequence into segments of length 2n- 4 (i.e., /6 -th 
of the period of the sequence), then we can label the first half of the sequence { x1, ... , xs}. 
The second half of the sequence is then {x1, ... ,xs}. Now as we consider C({;,), we can see 
that we have 
p 1 
C( 16 ) = P · 'l/J ({x1, ... ,xs,x1, ... ,xs},{xs,x1, ... ,x7,xs,x1, ... ,x7}) 
1 
= P ·'l/J({x1, . . . ,xs},{xs,x1, ... ,x7}) + 'l/J ({x1 , ... ,xs},{xs,x1, ... ,x7}) (3.10) 
2 
= p · 'l/J ({x1, ... ,xs},{xs,x1, ... ,x7}) 
Although this can be 0, we do not know that it is definitely 0. In fact, we give an example in 
Chapter 4 of a specific maximal length T-function where this is not 0. 
Now we will consider the case where we keep m many bits. First, let us simplify our 
notation by using Xii to refer to the j-th bit of Xi· That is , Xii = [xi]j. In a keystream S, we 
will have i E {1, .. . , 2n} and j E {n, ... , (n - m + 1)} since the (n - m) least significant bits 
are lost when we apply the filtering function 9m· 
x 
0 
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Figure 3.1 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator (see Chapter 
4) with n = 16 and g1. 
Theorem 3.5.2 Given a sequence S produced by a maximal length T-junction and a filtering 
function gm : Xi t--t [xi]n, .. . , [xi]n-m+1, the value of the autocorrelation function C evaluated 
at a phase shift of one half the period zs m;;-2 That is, C( ~) = m;;-2 for period P of the 
sequence S . 
Proof: Let S1 be a binary sequence produced by a maximal length T -function filtered as 
in Equation 3.1 with period P. Let S2 be S1 with a phase shift ~ - Consider Si E @mas them 
bits taken from the i-th output state. We index each bit of Si with our simplified notation siJ . 
Now, consider each Si · By Theorem 3.4.3, we have Sin # s(i+2n- I)n' and for (n - m) < j < n, 
we have SiJ = S(i+2n-1 )J. 
So, wit h this shift ~ we have m - 1 values of j (namely j = (n - m + 1), . .. , n) such t hat 
SiJ = s(i+2n- I)J' and 1 value of j (namely j = n) such that SiJ # S(i+2n- I) J· This means that 
for (n - m) < j < n, we have '!ji(siJ,s(i+2n- 1)) = 1, and for j = n, '!ji (siJ, s(i+2n- 1)) = - 1. 
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Notice that the period P = m · 2n, and there are 2n many m-tuples Si· Therefore, we have 
This concludes our proof. • 
p 1 
C(2) = P 'ljJ(S1,S2 ) 
= ~ (2n(l)(m - 1) + 2n(-1)) 
1 
m . 2n (2n)(m - 2) 
m - 2 
m 
We give an experimental example of Theorem 3.5.2 for a specific maximal length T-function 
in Table A.l. 
It may seem that with this result it is desirable to have m = 2 so that the correlation 
at t = ~ is 0. However, this correlation is 0 because of a very identifiable pattern in the 
comparison of the original sequence and the shifted sequence. As we compare the sequences, 
the bits that come from the most significant bit of each state are complemented in the opposing 
sequence because of the observation made in Theorem 3.4.3. Whereas, the bits from the second 
most significant bit of each state (this bit slice has a period of ~) are the same in both the 
original sequence and the shifted sequence. So, the XOR of the two sequences is 101010 ... 10, 
which suggest s a high correlation even though the value of the autocorrelation function is 0. 
These identifiable correlations for specific values oft in relation to the period P may or may 
not be a source of direct attack. It is still an open problem as to how many correlations can be 
found for the cycle of a maximal length T-function. In the following chapter, we will look at 
the correlations that we have found for the specific generator proposed by Klimov and Shamir. 
However, as we think about the practical use of a T-function based keystream generator, we 
should see that there may be some disadvantages associated with these particular correlations. 
For example, assume that we use a particular initial state that was later compromised. This 
keystream that is known by an adversary should no longer be used. However, not only should 
this keysteam not be used, but the keys that will produce a sequence that is correlated with 
this sequence should be avoided as well. These are any of the keys that will give a keystream 
of which a segment overlaps of the point in the cycle that is ~ steps from the compromised 
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key. In a large cycle, this is a small concern, but it is perhaps as much of a concern as the 
fixed point 0 of a maximal length LFSR. 
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CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION OF KLIMOV-SHAMIR GENERATOR 
In the following pages, we will discuss some traditional techniques for evaluating the prop-
erties of a binary keystream. Furthermore, we will apply these techniques to the function 
presented by Klimov and Shamir in (7), and we will analyze the results of these tests. 
4.1 Proposed Keystream Generator by Klimov and Shamir 
In (7) Klimov and Shamir identified an interesting family of T -functions that are maximal 
length T-functions. Namely, the functions f defined for n 2: 3 by 
x f = x + ( x2 V C) (mod 2n) ( 4.1) 
where C = 5 (mod 8) or C = 7 (mod 8). This particular family of functions is interesting 
not only for its maximal cycles, but also for its efficiency in hardware. These functions are 
comprised of three primitive operations, which is the smallest number of primitive operations 
that defines a function that is potentially useful for cryptographic purposes. 
The following is proved as Theorem 3 in (7) by Klimov and Shamir. 
Theorem 4.1.1 The mapping xf = x + (x2 V C) (mod 2n) over n-bit words is invertible if 
and only if the least significant bit of C is 1. For n 2: 3 it is a permutation with a single cycle 
if and only if the least significant bit and the third least significant bit of C are 1. 
Klimov and Shamir propose C to be 5. The keystream generator with f defined as xf = 
x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) as the next-state function and a filtering function of the form gm : 
Xi f---> [xi]n, ... , [xi]n-m+l for some m such that 1 :S m < n will be referred to as the Klimov-
Shamir keystream generator. In the following sections, we discuss some of the properties of 
the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator. 
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4.2 Evaluation Using Golomb's Randomness Postulates 
In this section, we will analyze the "randomness" of the keystream of a Klimov-Shamir 
keystream generator using Golomb's Postulates stated in Section 2.3. In doing so, we hope to 
determine whether or not a potential keystream from the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator 
meets our minimum requirements for pseudorandomness. 
4.2.1 Evaluation Using Postulate 1 
The first postulate states that in the period of a pseudorandom sequence S, the number 
of l 's should differ from the number of O's by at most 1. From Theorem 3.4.2 we know that 
for any maximal length T-function a shift of 2i output steps from a given output x gives the 
complement of the i-th bit of x, while the i - 1 least significant bits remain unchanged. First 
we look at a stream that is created using 91· That is , only the most significant bit of each state 
is kept for the output . From Theorem 3.4.2 we can easily see that the number of l's and O's is 
the same since each 1 in the first half of the period is complemented by a 0 in the second half of 
the period. Likewise, the O's are complemented by l's. Now, if use 92 as our filtering function, 
we will have the n-th bit of each state is still represented in the output , but the ( n - 1 )-th bit 
slice has a period of length 2n- 1 . Therefore, we will have two copies of this period, and each 
period will have an equal number of l's and O's. Therefore, we can see that the number of l's 
and O's of an output sequence will be exactly the same regardless of our choice of m for our 
filtering function 9m. 
4.2.2 Evaluation Using Postulate 2 
Golomb's second postulate presents a more difficult question to answer in regards to the 
Klimov-Shamir keystream generator. We want to show that approximately one half of the runs 
in the sequence have length one, one fourth have length two, one eighth have length three, and 
so on. In order to find the percentages of runs that have a certain length, we resort to testing. 
We generate keystreams for various values of n, and we focus on the keystreams where we keep 
one bit of the internal state. 
n 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
I 
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Table 4.1 Percentage of total runs and length of runs in then-th bit slice 
of xf = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) for various values of n. 
Length----> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Runs l ratio 
130 0.4615 0.2615 0.1538 0.0923 0.0308 0 0 0 
514 0.5136 0.2412 0.1284 0.0506 0.0272 0.0117 0.0156 0.0117 
2050 0.5034 0.2400 0.1171 0.0800 0.0361 0.0107 0.0068 0.0029 
8190 0.5004 0.2493 0.1243 0.0628 0.0291 0.0200 0.0076 0.0037 
32770 0.5022 0.2474 0.1269 0.0592 0.0313 0.0170 0.0079 0.0040 
00 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.0625 0.0313 0.0156 0.0078 0.0039 
First, using g1 , we can say that there are exactly as many gaps as there are blocks, which 
is one requirement of Postulate 2. For m > 1, this is not necessarily true since we sometimes 
see an odd number of runs of a certain length when m > l. However, we have no reason to 
believe that there is a large discrepancy in the number of gaps and the number of blocks. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the ratio of the runs of a given length to the total number of 
runs in the keystream. For these keystreams to satisfy Postulate 2, these ratios should be 
approximately the same as the bottom row labelled 'I'. For this ideal case, the ratio is simply 
2- k where k is the length of the run. 
From the Table 4.1, we can see that the percentage of runs of length one is close to 50% 
of the total number of runs. In fact, for n = 14 we have 50.04% of the runs have length one. 
However, we find that for n = 16 we have 50.223 of the runs have length one. This shows that 
the percentage of runs of length one does not monotonically approach 50% as we increase n , 
but we expect that these values will be very close to ideal for large n. We also note that the 
percentage of longer runs seems to be reasonably close to the ideal as well, especially for larger 
values of n. 
n 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
34 
Table 4.2 Percentage of total runs and length of runs in the n-th bit slice 
of x f = x + ( x 2 V 5) (mod 2n) for various values of n (continued). 
Length ____, 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Runs l ratio 
130 0 0 0 0 0 0 
514 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 0.0020 0.0010 0 0 0 0 
8190 0.0015 0.0005 0.0005 0 0.0005 0 
32770 0.0021 0.0013 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 00 0.0020 0.0010 0.0005 0.00024 0.00012 0.00006 0.00003 
4.2.3 Evaluation Using Postulate 3 
Now consider Golomb's third postulate. As was stated in Section 2.3, 
The autocorrelation function C(t) of a sequence Sis two-valued. That is for period P and 
for some integer K, 
1 p {1 C(t) = P · ~(2[S]i - 1) · (2[S]i+t - 1) = ; 
p1 
if t = 0 (mod P) , 
if 1 s t s P - 1 (mod P) 
(4)(12) 
Now, we want to examine whether or not the autocorrelation function is two valued for the 
Klimov-Shamir keystream generator. 
Consider the case where we keep only the most significant bit of each output to form our 
binary sequence. Recall that a special case of Theorem 3.5.l shows that we have C( ~) = -1 
for any maximal length T-function, so we know that this keystream does not satisfy Postulate 
3. However, we would like to find other phase shifts t where C(t) -1- 0. 
As we test the autocorrelation for small values of n, we see that there are other values of 
t that produce a high correlation in absolute value. We have determined that for 9 s n s 20 
(values of n > 20 have not been tested) if t = kP or '.£P, C(t) = --i· We also see that for 
t = ~p or iP, C(t) = -i which is the expected result from Theorem 3.5.1. For t = ; 2 P or 
~;P, C(t) = -;{2 , and therefore, t = gp or ~~p gives C(t) = 372 . 
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Figure 4.1 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 12 
and g1. 
It is interesting that the value of C( ~) is invariant for 9 ::::; n ::::; 20, but we do not have a 
mathematical explanation for this occurrence. The value does seem to stabilize for n > 9, but 
we have no proof that it will remain the same for n = 64 or n = 128. As we look at graphs 
of the value of C(t) for all phase shifts t over various values of n, we can see t hat at several 
phase shifts in relation to P , we obtain t he same value for C(t) regardless of n. In Figures 4.1 
and 4.2, we can see this pattern. Graphs for other values of n can be found in t he Appendix. 
For rotation by ~, we seem to also get a correlation of 0 for n > 6. This is the case t hat 
was examined in Section 3.5 via Equation 3.10. We simply know that 
and for n = 6, C( ~) /; 0. We have no guarantee t hat it will be 0 for large values of n. 
However , it does seem that for n 2: 7, that this autocorrelation value stabilizes to 0. 
The fact that certain autocorrelation values for phase shifts relative to the period remain 
fixed for several values of n is rather puzzling. It suggests t hat there is some underlying struc-
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Figure 4.2 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 14 
and 91· 
ture that we have not completely identified. This leads us to the next interesting observation. 
Let S be the sequence where n = 20, m = 1 and the initial state is 0. This means that 
the first bit of the sequence is the most significant bit of Of. If we create a subsequence S210 
by taking every 210-th bit of the period of this sequence S (in general we have a subsequence 
S2k for any integer k < n), we see that there is an easily identifiable pattern in the sequence. 
The pattern 010 is repeated through the first half of the subsequence S210. Then the pattern 
is complemented and we see 101 repeated in the second half of the period until the end of the 
period of the sequence. Of course, if we look at every 29-th bit of S, we will have the pattern 
0 * 1 * O* where * is any bit. So, as we decrease by a factor of one half the number of bits that 
we skip in the sequence S (i.e., decrease k by one), we expect the pattern to at least double in 
length. It turns out that the * bits are also repeated and we have 011100, which is repeated 
through the first half of the subsequence S29. 
If we use the autocorrelation function on the first half of our subsequence S2k, we should 
get 1 when we shift the length of a repeated pattern t (note: since the length of the pattern 
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Table 4.3 Length of bit patterns in the subsequence S2k of t he keystream 
of x f = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 220) with initial st ate 0 and filtering 
function g1 ; autocorrelation values C(t ) of the first half of t he 
subsequence. 
k Pattern length t C(t) 
10 3 1 
9 6 1 
8 12 0.9960 
7 24 0.9960 
6 48 0.9941 
5 192 0.9863 
4 384 0.9853 
is not a factor of the length of the first half of the sequence, as we check the autocorrelation 
value, we simply drop the excess bits in the original sequence in order to make it a multiple 
of the pattern length) . Now, tis t he period of the first half of our subsequence S2k. However, 
if we settle for a correlation close to 1, we find can find a pseudo-pattern that may be much 
shorter t han actual period of t he subsequence. With a threshold of C(t) > 0.98, t he first t bits 
of t he subsequence S2k can describe t he whole sequence S2k wit h a high level of accuracy. We 
have small discrepancies in t he repetit ion of a particular pattern, but nearly all of t he bits of 
the first half of the subsequence S2k can be found by repeating our pattern, and nearly all of 
the bits of t he second half of S2 k can be found by repeating t he complement of the pattern. 
In Table 4.3, we can see t he lengths our patterns t hat meet the t hreshold value of C(t) > 0.98 
for various values of k. We leave an explanation of t his phenomenon as an open problem. 
4.3 Proposed Attacks on the Klimov-Shamir Generator 
In (8), Klimov and Shamir propose an attack on the generator by ident ifying a state where 
the ~ least significant bits of t he n-bit output are all 0. Assume t his is the case and let the ~ 
most significant bits be represented as y E JIB l} . Now our state Xi can be written as (y I 0 ... 0) . 
.._,_.., 
n 
2 
When we evaluate the state Xi with our next state function x f = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n), we 
have xd = (y I 0 . .. 0) + (0 V 5) = Xi+ 5 (mod 2n) . Therefore, t hem most significant bits 
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of xd will be the same as the m most significant bits of Xi for large n. We would expect 
the m most significant bits to be t he same in two randomly chosen consecutive states with a 
probability of approximately 2-m. So, if m is large enough we have a high probability that if 
two consecutive states Xi and xd have ident ical upper bits, t hen the least significant half of 
Xi is 0. Now we have the m most significant bits, and we guess that the ~ least significant 
bits are 0. This leaves us with ( ~ - m) unknown bits in the state Xi of the generator. Also, 
because of the structure of t he cycle discussed in Chapter 3, we know that exactly one state 
in 2% consecutive states is equivalent to 0 modulo 2%. From this point, we can guess at the 
unknown bits of Xi and then simply simulate the keystream generator to verify if our guesses 
are correct. 
Also in (8), Klimov and Shamir present an improved attack similar to the one above. 
Assume t he state x has O's in the least significant ~ bits. T hat is, 
2n n 
x = 23 xu + 2 3xv + Xw where Xw = 0 
It follows that 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
( 4.4) 
Therefore, we know that t he difference between the most significant bits of x and x f is x;. 
Klimov and Shamir then state that if Xv is known and Xw is 0, then we can calculate Xv after 
2% · k steps for several k. If we make a table of these values, we can find Xv . 
Vincent Benony et al. propose an attack against the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator 
(1). The attack has a time complexity of 0(2~) and memory complexity of O(n log2 n) . 
However , this att ack requires that we keep half of the output bits of each internal state. That 
is, m = ~· Benony et al. focus on the particular states "where the half-higher of t he half-lower 
bits of t he internal states are zeros ... " That is, 
(4.5) 
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We can write the state x = { u I 0 ... 0 I v }. Now, Benony observes that x + (x2 V C) = 
'-.y-/ 
n 
4 
{ u(2v + 1) I v + ( v 2 V C)} with u(2v + 1) E lB ~ and v + ( v2 V C) E lB ~. This result is proven 
in (1). 
Now, u is the ~ most significant bits of the state x, and u' is the ~ most significant bits 
of xf. So, from above, we have u' = u(2v + 1) (mod 2~). Next, observe that for consecutive 
states, the upper halves of the state u and u' have the same number of O's at the end. The 
proof given is simple. 
Let k be the number of zeros at the end of u. So, u = 2ku, where u is an odd 
number and u' = 2ku(2v + 1) (mod 2~). As 2v + 1 is an odd number too, the 
product u(2v + 1) is odd, then u' has exactly k zeros at its end (1). 
Utilizing these two results, we can mount an attack by trying to solve the equation u' = 
u(2v + 1) (mod 2~) for all consecutive outputs u, u' that have the same number of zeros at 
the end. When this equation is solvable, the state must be verified . In order to verify if the 
state has been guessed correctly, a simulated generator is implemented starting at the state 
that has been guessed. This is then compared with the several consecutive outputs of the 
actual keystream and checked for discrepancies. According to Benony et al., ~ many states are 
needed to identify if the guess is correct, and the verification process has a data complexity of 
0( n log2 n) . The argument for these values can be found in (1). 
The previous attack is efficient , but it can be avoided by if we choose to output fewer bits 
of the internal state to the keystream generator. The authors of (1) state that one way to 
prevent the attack is to "use another filtering function to produce the output from the internal 
state; this could reduce the data rate of the PRG [pseudorandom generator], but it would also 
increase its security (1)." Also, this attack requires that the value of log2 C < ~in the function 
xf = x + (x2 V C) (mod 2n), so the authors suggest that the attack may be prevented by 
choosing a large value of C. 
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4.4 A P roposed Construction 
Recall the self-shrinking generator from Section 1.3 that is created with a single LFSR. In 
a similar fashion, we can create a keystream from the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator. 
We use the filtering function g2 so that each of the 2n states Xi contributes a pair of bits to 
the keystream. Use the bit pairs ([xi]n, [xi]n-i) in a similar manner as in the self-shrinking 
generator to define a new filtering function 
(4.6) 
With this function, we have an output keystream that is 2n-i_periodic. 
Theorem 4.4 .1 Given a maximal length T-junction f and the filtering function defined in 
Equation 4.6, the keystream generated by applying these functions has a period (not necessarily 
least period) of length 2n- i. 
P roof: First recall that the (n-1)-th bit slice has a period oflength 2n-i by Theorem 3.4.2. 
We know by Theorem 3.4.3 that the first 2n-i bits of then-th bit slice are the complement of 
the second 2n- i bits of the n-th bit slice. Now, notice that the n-th bit slice chooses which of 
the bits from the (n -1)-th bit slice are kept. From the first 2n-i many pairs we keep a subset 
Xi = {h]n- i : [xi]n = 1 for 1 ::::; i::::; 2n- i }, and from the second 2n-i many pairs we keep the 
subset X2 = {[xi]n- i: [xi]n = 1 for (2n-i + 1) ::::; i :=::; 2n}. 
Notice that for 1 ::::; ii ::::; 2n- i and [xi1 ]n = 1, we have (2n- i + 1) ::::; i2 = ii+ 2n- i ::::; 2n 
where [xi2 ]n = 0 by Theorem 3.4.3. The case where [xi1 ]n = 0 ==? [xi2 ]n = 1 is similar. 
Therefore, we keep exactly 1 of the bits from the states Xi 1 and Xi2 when ii = i2 (mod 2n-i ). 
Hence, we keep exactly 2n-i many bits from each period of the next-state function f. It follows 
directly that this sequence is 2n- i periodic. • 
We can see from this proof that each bit from the (n -1)-th bit slice is represented exactly 
once in this new keystream. This means that this keystream satisfies Postulate 1 as does the 
(n -1)-th bit slice. However, since we have rearranged the bits, we cannot make a claim as to 
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the similarity of the new keystream and the (n - 1)-th bit slice in regards to Postulate 2. As 
we consider Postulate 3, it would helpful if we could derive a general proof for the least period 
of this sequence. However, we only give conditions for when we can say that the least period 
is 2n-l. 
Assume Xi and Xj are separated by (2n- 2 - 1) many l's in the n-th bit slice of the cycle of 
f and [xi]n = [xJ]n = 1. This is the case that where the state Xi contributes a bit [xi]n-1 to the 
keystream and Xj contributes the bit [xj]n-1 that is 2n-2 many output steps from [xi]n-1 in 
the keystream. If [xi]n-1 # [xj]n- 1, then 2n-l is the least period of the keystream. In order to 
claim that the least period is not 2n- 1, we have to show that for every pair Xi and Xj satisfying 
the above conditions, we have [xi]n-1 = [xJ]n- 1· In a random sequence, we have a probability 
of ~ that any pair of Xi and Xj with differ in the second most significant bit. Therefore, if the 
sequence behaves like a random sequence, we would be very "unlucky" to obtain a sequence 
that has least period less than 2n-1 . Of course, a pseudorandom sequence is not random, and 
we have to run tests to verify that the least period is 2n-1 . 
Definition 4.4.2 The keystream generator with next-state function xf = x+ (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) 
and filtering function from Equation 4.6 is called the K-S shrinking generator. 
We can examine the keystream of a K-S shrinking generator using small values of n to 
support the argument above. First, if we take n = 3, we find that the keystream of the K-S 
shrinking generator is 1010 .... This of course has least period 2, so we need n > 3. If we look 
at values of n = 4, ... , 16 we see that each of these keystreams does have least period 2n- 1 , 
and it can be seen in Figure 4.3 that the smallest nonzero phase shift with an autocorrelation 
value of 1 is the shift of 2n- 1 . Using these tests as a basis for the expected behavior of the K-S 
shrinking generator, we make the following conjecture: 
Conjecture: The keystream of a K-S shrinking generator has least period of length 2n- l 
for any integer n 2 4. 
If this conjecture is true, we have a keystream generator with some desirable properties. 
We can see that from Figure 4.3 that not only does the period seem to be large, but in fact, 
this keystream seems satisfy Postulate 3 much more closely than the original Klimov-Shamir 
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keystream generator. Also, note that for the values of n that we tested it is not the case that 
the second half of the period is the complement of the first as is the case with the Klimov-
Shamir keystream generator. Hence we do not see an autocorrelation value of -1 for a shift of 
half of the period in Figure 4.3. This means that the linear complexity of this stream is greater 
than 2n- 2 + 1 which is the lower bound of a sequence of length 2n- l (2). Therefore, when 
we use the K-S shrinking generator we obtain a more complex structure than the (n - 1)-th 
bit slice. However, the maximum linear complexity we could obtain with the K-S shrinking 
generator is 2n- l which is actually less than then-th bit slice of the Klimov-Shamir keystream 
generator which has complexity 2n- l + l. In this case, linear complexity may not be the best 
indication of which keystream is more desirable for cryptographic purposes. 
Graphs of C(t) for the K-S shrinking generator with various values of n can be found in the 
Appendix. In these graphs, we do not see any phase shifts relative to the period that maintain 
a constant correlation value as we see in the original keystream construction. The keystream 
generated with this construction seems to have desirable properties for a PRNG, but these 
claims need to be tested further. 
Finally, the implementation of the K-S shrinking generator should be considered carefully. 
As with the original shrinking generator using LFSR sequences, the production of bits using 
this generator is not constant. As the generator steps through a string of O's in the n-th bit 
slice, the generator outputs nothing. In (3), Coppersmith et al. discuss a method of overcoming 
this implementation challenge. A small buffer of output bits can be maintained. Bits can be 
taken from the buffer at a constant rate even when a string of O's occurs in then-th bit slice. 
This is a small issue with the K-S shrinking generator that would need to be worked out in 
the implementation of the generator. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
Maximal length T-functions have been presented by Klimov and Shamir as an efficient 
(and perhaps non-linear) replacement of LFSR's and linear congruential mappings as a cryp-
tographic building block (9). In Chapter 3, we examined the properties of the cycles and bit 
slices of maximal length T-functions, and we found that the robust structure which ensures that 
the period has maximal length may be the source of unwanted correlations for cryptographic 
applications. 
In (7), Klimov and Shamir specifically propose the function xf = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) as 
a possible source of pseudorandomness. Klimov points out that this function is not extremely 
secure. However, he claims it can be used as "an exceptionally fast source of (weak) pseudo-
randomness (7)." Klimov and Shamir also present a few attacks for this function in (8) which 
we presented in Chapter 4. When we keep ~ many bits of each internal state, the generator 
can be attacked quite efficiently as presented by Benony et al. in (1). So, we reiterate that 
m << n where m is the number of bits that are kept from each n-bit output state. However, 
even if m = 1, we still have a robust structure in this bit slice of the cycle of our maximal 
length T-function. 
We present one possible variation of the the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator that seems 
to create a keystream with desirable properties. This may suggest that we can find ways to 
create secure keystreams built with maximal length T-functions. 
Open Problems 
A few open problems that we have identified as interesting are as follows: 
l. For a bit slice of a maximal length T-function, which phase shifts t in proportion to the 
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period (other than t = ~ and t = t) give an autocorrelation value C(t) that can be 
identified for any maximal length T-function? 
2. For a bit slice of xf = x + (x2 V 5) (mod 2n) , which phase shifts t in proportion to the 
period (other than t = ~ and t = t) give an autocorrelation value C (t) that can be 
identified for an arbitrary value n? Do these correlations pose a threat to the security of 
the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator? 
3. What is the explanation for the patterns found in the subsequences S 2k presented in 
Section 4.2.3? Do these patterns present an opportunity for attack on the Klimov-Shamir 
keystream generator? 
4. Is the following conjecture t rue? 
Conjecture: The keystream of a K-S shrinking generator has least period of length 2n-l 
for any integer n 2:: 4. 
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APPENDIX TABLES AND GRAPHS 
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Figure A.l C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 10 
and 91· 
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Figure A.3 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 14 
and g1. 
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Figure A.4 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 16 
and 91· 
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Table A.1 Experimental values of C( ~) for a single cycle of the 
Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 9 and various val-
ues of min the filtering function 9m : Xii---; [xi]n, ... , [xi]n- m+l· 
m C(~) 
1 -1 
2 0 
3 1 3 
4 1 2 
5 3 5 
6 2 3 
7 5 7 
8 3 4 
9 7 9 
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Figure A.7 C(t) of the Klimov-Shamir keystream generator with n = 12 
and g3. 
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Figure A.8 C(t) of the K-S shrinking generator with n = 10. 
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Figure A.9 C(t) of the K-S shrinking generator with n = 12. 
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Figure A.10 C(t) of the K-S shrinking generator with n = 14. 
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